◆ Flare Summer Signal · Coston2

Prove you're solvent.
Reveal nothing.

Vouchsafe lets an RWA issuer or FXRP agent prove reserves ≥ liabilities without publishing its balance sheet. Liabilities stay private; confidential-reserves mode hides the reserve total too. A real enclave computes the claim, FDC anchors the evidence, and attestors post a stake they lose if they lied.

Watch the 3-min demo → Verify the real-TEE record
Interoperable Asset Products — FDC Web2Json + real FXRP agent Confidential Compute Apps — TEE compute + on-chain ecrecover
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Judge this from evidence, not promises

Six primary checks. All public.

The demo is backed by deployed bytecode, finalized transactions, an XRPL payment and a Google-signed Confidential Space attestation. Open any card and verify it without trusting this website.

7source-verified contracts
10solvency records
5stake-backed quorums
3frauds revoked
2FDC attestation types
The protocol

One record, two independent proofs

Every attestation must clear all five stages. Watch them light up as a proof runs — the same spine drives the honest path and the fraud path below.

Private inputs
Reserves & liabilities never leave the issuer
idle
Confidential compute
Enclave checks & signs a commitment
idle
FDC data proof
Web2Json attests off-chain reserves
idle
On-chain record
"Solvent at T" — hash only, no numbers
idle
Accountability
Stake backs the claim · slashed if false
idle
Act I · The issuer

Prove solvency confidential

Feed the enclave your figures. Only a signed commitment and an FDC reserve proof reach the chain — the raw numbers stay with you. Runs live on Coston2 (~2 min for one FDC round).

Issuer input private

Subject is the FXRP agent vault whose solvency you're asserting.

Enter figures to preview the enclave's verdict locally.

Commitment builder on-chain hash

This reproduces, in your browser, the keccak256(abi.encode(…)) the verifier computes on-chain. It's proof that the chain only ever stores a hash.

▲ Stays private

Inside the enclave · never transmitted

reserves Σ
liabilities Σ

◆ Goes on-chain

The only thing the world sees

inputHash
reservesCommitment

Change any figure or the salt and both hashes change completely — yet neither can be reversed back to the numbers. The live proof above uses a fresh CSPRNG salt generated inside the enclave.

Live trace

Real orchestration: enclave signature → FDC round-trip → recordSolvency on Coston2.

Act II · The counterparty

Verify without numbers public

Anyone can confirm "solvent at T" straight from the chain. Paste an attestation id — you'll see the exact registry record and nothing more. No reserves. No liabilities.

Act III · The consequence

Lie, and lose the stake

Privacy without accountability is just a secret. Here a malicious attestor signs "solvent" over figures that are actually insolvent, records it — then anyone reveals the committed figures and slashes the stake.

The fraud

Reserves < liabilities, but signed solvent = true.

1
Malicious sign — the TEE key signs a false "solvent" claim.
2
Record — it lands on-chain, backed by a live stake.
3
Challenge — anyone reveals the committed reserves, liabilities, salt that open inputHash with reserves < liabilities.
4
Slash — the verifier revokes the record and the stake is forfeited.

Stake at risk

The attestor's bonded collateral, before and after the slash.

— C2FLRstake: — C2FLR
Act IV · The quorum

Many stakes, one claim

An issuer can demand that independent staked attestors co-sign an attestation before it counts as final. Every endorser puts their own bond behind the same claim — and is slashed with the recorder if it is ever proven false. Endorse from your own wallet, or let the service's second attestor do it.

Your attestor wallet MetaMask · Coston2

Checking for a browser wallet…

active stake

Endorsing locks your stake for the claim's challenge window. If the claim is proven fraudulent, you are slashed alongside the recording attestor — only endorse what you have re-verified.

Why quorum matters

1
Per-subject policy — the issuer sets requiredEndorsements, a stake floor, and a slash penalty on the verifier.
2
Independent re-check — each endorser re-runs the confidential computation before backing the claim.
3
Shared liability — one fraud proof slashes the recorder and every endorser in a single transaction.
4
Finality signal — consumers read isQuorate(id): solvency is only "final" once enough independent capital backs it.

Attestation history

Every attestation recorded by this deployment, straight from on-chain events — commitments only.

idsubjectattestorat Tstatusendorsementstx
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Act V · The XRPL rail

XRPL-native reserve proof FDC Payment

Reserves for FXRP agents live on the XRP Ledger. Alongside the Web2Json amount proof, a subject proves it controls its registered XRP reserve address: it answers a contract-derived challenge with a 1-drop XRPL payment whose memo carries the challenge reference, FDC attests the payment, and XrplReserveProof.proveControl verifies everything on-chain — no custodian API in the loop.

Under the hood

Two Flare rails, one guarantee

Neither bounty is decorative: recordSolvency reverts unless it receives both a valid enclave signature and a valid FDC proof from the subject's approved source.

confidential The enclave

The solvency check and every sensitive figure run inside a TEE extension. It emits a domain-separated EIP-191 signature over the commitment; the verifier recovers the signer on-chain and requires it to equal the registered enclave address — the FCC settlement pattern.

Raw figures are computed and discarded in-enclave. Liabilities are committed with a secret salt and are never recoverable from the chain.

interoperable The data + asset rails

An FDC Web2Json proof brings the off-chain reserves on-chain through the full round-trip (prepare → FdcHub → Relay → DA-layer → verify). The subject is bound to a real FXRP agent vault, and an FDC Payment proof adds an XRPL-native reserve-address control check — all resolved via FlareContractRegistry, no hardcoded addresses.

The reserve proof must come from a per-subject source the owner pre-registered, so an attestor can't fabricate reserves from their own endpoint.

Honest scope shipped vs remaining

✓ Shipped and verifiable

Explorer + Google attestation evidence today

GCP Confidential Space (AMD SEV)real run
On-chain ecrecover verificationlive
FDC Web2Json + XRPL Paymentlive
FXRP · quorum · stake/slashlive

◐ FCC production handoff

Precisely separated from completed evidence

Native Action/DataFixed adaptertested
FlareTeeManager extension 66194registered
Production proxy + machine promotionpending access
Current settlement pathdirect TEE sig